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Irregular migration in Greece : What is at stake? 




The loss of over a thousand human lives in an effort to cross the Mediterranean during April 2015 has 
once again drawn media and political attention to the challenges that the EU is facing in governing 
irregular migration and asylum in the region. However, what seems to be still missing is our (experts’ and 




What are the motivations that are so strong or what is the information migrants have? How do they 
organise their journey and how do they respond to changing policies such as more intensive enforcement 
at the border, or more expansive rescue operations at sea? How much do they know and how accurate is 
their information? How much are they in control of their own destinies and how much do they accept 
contingency and risk? In a nutshell, how do they navigate restrictive policies and enforcement? 
Answering these questions is crucial to our understanding of irregular migration dynamics in general, and 
in the Mediterranean in particular. Casting light to these issues contributes to assessing the effectiveness 
of current policies and to the development of more effective as well as more humane policy approaches. 
 
The IRMA Project 
 
This policy brief presents the findings of the IRMA project, Governing Irregular Migration: States, 
Migrants and Intermediaries at the Age of Globalisation, funded by the Greek Secretariat for Research 
and Innovation (ARISTEIA programme, 2012-2015).  
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Irregular Migration in Greece: What is at stake? 
Since the mid-2000s, Greece has been an important first country of arrival in Europe for irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers that are heading west and north. During the period 2009-2012, the relevant 
irregular migration and asylum seeking routes through Morocco and Spain and through Libya and Italy 
have been significantly reduced with the Greek-Turkish corridor having absorbed the brunt of such 
pressures. The main bulk of the irregular migration and asylum seeking flows towards Europe, during the 
period 2009-2012, were arriving through the Greek-Turkish land border in the north-eastern corner of 
Greece, across the Evros River.  
However, irregular migration and asylum seeking routes have been shifting in the last two years (2013-
2014), with the outflows from Syria turning to the Aegean islands where arrivals have increased tenfold in 
the first six months of 2014 compared to 2013. At the same time, the Greek Turkish land border has been 
largely abandoned by irregular migrants and their smugglers who choose to head towards central-western 
Europe through Bulgaria, FYROM and Serbia.  
An overview of the main size of stocks and flows of legal and irregular migrants and asylum seekers shows 
that approximately 8.5% of Greece’s total population are foreigners. Indeed, Greece has been 
characterised by relatively high irregular migrant population stocks and flows during the past 25 years. 
The influx of irregular migrants, as reflected in the number of apprehensions, has been fluctuating across 
the different border areas. One such striking example has been the drastic reduction in the influx at the 
Greek-Albanian border as of 2011, though this is closely related to the visa exemption of Albanian 
nationals who are entering the EU for periods shorter than 90 days as of December 2010.  
As regards Europe’s “hotspot” for irregular migration-namely the Greek-Turkish border- the available 
figures show that when entries through the land border drop, arrivals through the maritime borders rise 
and vice versa. These trends are strongly influenced by geopolitical developments in the region since the 
Arab spring in 2011 and particularly the implosion of the Libyan regime, the conflict in Syria as well as the 
overall instability and conflict in the Middle East that have reshuffled the irregular migration and asylum 
seeking routes in the Mediterranean. Thus, while in 2012-2013, Italy carried the brunt of these 
developments, during 2014 and the first months of 2015, numbers of arrivals at the Greek Turkish 
borders in the Aegean Sea and the islands have increased dramatically from just over 2,500 in 2013, to 
over 42,000 in 2014. A fourfold further increase is registered if we compare the first three months of 2014 
and the first three months of 2015 (3,324 apprehensions at the Greek Turkish sea border in January to 
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Figure 1: Apprehensions of irregular migrants, per border, 2009-2014 
 
 
Note: data refer to apprehensions, not to people. Hence the same person if apprehended twice counts 
twice. Data for 2014 refer to the first 8 months. 
Source: Greek police data,  
 
A closer look at the nationalities of the migrants apprehended in Greece reveals the emergence of Syrians 
as the largest group by 2014; having registered for the first time in the top-5 arrivals in 2012, they rose to 
the 2nd place in 2013 and accounted for 3/4s of all apprehensions at the Greek Turkish sea border (32,000 
out of 42,000) in 2014. Afghans remain an important group, despite a reduction in apprehensions 
compared to the period of 2009-2012, with numbers peaking to 12,901 in 2014. Pakistanis have also 
declined in absolute numbers from nearly 20,000 in 2011 to approximately 2,000 in 2014, though they 
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Figure 2: Apprehensions of irregular migrants in Greece (at the borders and within the 
country, 5 main nationality groups) 2009-2014 
 
 
Source: Ministry for the Protection of the Citizen, 
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform=view&id=50610&It
emid=1240&lang=  last accessed on 27 April 2015. 
 
Since 2009, Greece came under international scrutiny for its failing asylum system which was 
characterised by the inappropriate processing of the applications and the inability to provide effective 
protection to asylum seekers arriving at its shores and having to be handled in line with the Dublin II 
regulation. Greece’s detention policy towards asylum seekers was of major concern. Whether intercepted 
at the border or within the country, undocumented migrants and asylum seekers were routinely detained 
for shorter or longer periods. The country was heavily criticized both for the inappropriate conditions 
within the facilities and for the indiscriminate placement in detention. Greece’s practices stirred up 
further controversy in the course of 2014, after the Greek Legal Council published Advisory Opinion no 
44/2014, which held that it was legal for the Greek authorities to detain irregular migrants beyond 
eighteen (18) months – the maximum time allowed under Greek law – and prolong their detention 
indefinitely, until the latter consent to return to their home countries (see also Triandafyllidou, Angeli and 
Dimitriadi 2014).  
The Greek government that took office at the end of January 2015 has clearly signalled its will to stop 
indiscriminate detention, gradually releasing asylum seekers and irregular migrants that have been 
detained for long periods, and follow an overall more human-rights oriented approach. Faced with an 
upsurge in irregular arrivals in the islands, it has prioritised reception, open- and semi-open 
accommodation facilities and the adoption of integration schemes. Most recently, the deputy minister for 
Immigration Affairs suggested the distribution of asylum seekers across different municipalities within 
the country, amid however protests by several mayors. In many respects, the implementation of this new 
policy remains a challenge and the details still need to be worked out. 
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Policy Challenges  
Balancing priorities concerning the control of the national (and EU) borders, the overall management of 
irregular migration and asylum, and the protection of irregular migrants’ fundamental rights, requires a 
better understanding of how irregular migration takes place. What are the driving factors but also how 
migrants decide to move, mobilise resources, make plans, navigate and often bypass control policies 
(whether of fencing or gatekeeping nature) and eventually pursue their hope for a better life in Europe? 
Indeed a fundamental question that touches upon the essence of irregular migration, yet more often than 
not overlooked in scholarly and policy studies, is how migration control policies affect the plans and 
actions of irregular migrants and why some policies are more successful than others. 
The IRMA project investigates the dynamics of irregular migration (and asylum seeking) and the ways in 
which different actors and factors affect the nature and direction of the flows within an overall restrictive 
EU and national migration policy regime. The approach adopted is anthropocentric: it seeks to cast light 
to the governance of irregular migration starting not from the policies and the government actors, but 
rather zooming in on the migrant as the main agent in the migration process. It is our contention that 
such an anthropocentric perspective improves our actual understanding of how migration control and 
migration management policies affect irregular migration and thus indirectly leads to a better 
understanding of the governance of irregular migration and asylum. We propose to bypass the typical 
dichotomies between migration and asylum, between legal and irregular migration, between ‘real’ and 
‘bogus’ asylum seekers, between legal and informal employment. Instead we concentrate on the essence of 
mobility, notably the desire and need of the individuals to move, which brings them to navigate a complex 
environment despite their limited means and imperfect information. 
 
Key Messages for Policy Makers - What is suggested? 
Overall our findings suggest that repressive migration control policies, whether fencing, gatekeeping, 
internal and/or external, are not effective in overall reducing irregular migration nor in distinguishing 
irregular economic migrants from asylum seekers. 
This happens because it is not only the flows that are mixed but the motivations; people move for a set of 
usually complex reasons where the need for security and/or the pursuit of employment and/or lack of 
better economic prospects interact. 
Policy analysis has so far focussed too much on policy categories instead 
of looking at the motivations of the migrants and the ways they navigate 
the obstacles. 
Migrants’ assessment of risk and uncertainty is different than what we often assume, since they live under 
circumstances that are often beyond their control. Hence knowledge that they may be detained or that the 
journey involves important risks for their lives, or uncertainty as to whether they will reach their final 
preferred destination is counterbalanced by the desire and search for a better life. 
Policies that do not provide for alternative options for legal migration for both asylum seekers and 
economic migrants only empower smuggling networks, semi-legal intermediaries (like employment or 
travel agencies), and the informal economy.  
More specifically, the IRMA results provide insights into how different groups of apparently homogenous 
irregular migrants from three migration systems can shape their strategies in response to control policies 
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in place. In this context, the following key messages for policy makers would contribute to the 
effectiveness of irregular migration governance in Greece. 
 
Mixed flows cannot fit watertight policy categories of legal vs irregular, 
nor of irregular migrant vs asylum seeker: 
For populations that have been for decades on the move, and for whom migration continues to be a 
livelihood strategy, as is the case of Afghans arriving to Greece, border control policies do no deter the 
journey. On the contrary, they redirect the journey or extend the period of transit, or increase the price 
paid to smugglers. Additionally tight control of the borders traps irregular migrants and asylum seekers in 
Greece, making it impossible to continue their journey onwards to Italy or further north.  
Continued repression of irregular migration is indeed counterproductive. It proves to drive irregular 
migrants further underground, thereby empowering smuggling networks, and creating conditions for 
exploitation and human rights violations.  
It is necessary to point to the need of separating the root causes of emigration or asylum seeking 
and the decision making of the migrant that is contextually based and dynamic. 
Another area of policy implication concerns the response to the challenge of what is called ‘shock 
migration’1. For Greece (and Europe), this challenge has been posed by the tragic consequence of civil 
war in Syria and the need to provide protection to the people fleeing persecution and violence. 
With the current increase in new arrivals, the Greek state should ensure that there are sufficient 
reception centres with adequate facilities to accommodate newcomers. Upon arrival at sea or land 
borders, and in collaboration with civil society organisations, they should have access to medical care, 
psychological support and legal counsel.  
Early information and access to information centers: The IRMA results demonstrate that 
Greece’s policy of deterrence has not significantly diminished the overall population of irregular migrants. 
In addition, they show that migrants mostly rely on the often inaccurate information provided by relatives 
and smugglers.The authorities could invest instead in early information regarding available options, 
rights and procedures. This could lead to better outcomes both in reducing the flows and protecting 
migrants from exploitation. Such information could be achieved by creating information 
centres in the countries of origin and transit zones as well as opening telephone lines. The 
international experience has shown that tailored approaches by ethnicity/nationality and geographic 
location are essential in reaching the target audience. 
 
Detention is inhuman and does not contribute to a sustainable 
management of irregular migration 
The findings of IRMA suggest that apprehension and temporary detention do not necessarily lead to 
effective returns, in particular for migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, though significant steps have 
been taken to step up expulsions.  
Moreover, the policy of detention does not seem to deter, only to reshape the migratory route or extend 
migrants’ transit stage. As in the case of Afghani irregular migration, the detention policy proved to 
                                                           
1
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impact routes, pushed migrants “in hiding”, limited access to the asylum process and imposed 
imprisonment on a population that committed an administrative but not a criminal offence.  
 
Screening of cases: Foreigners currently residing in Greece in an irregular manner ought not to be 
indiscriminately treated as irregular migrants in term of status. Accordingly, the rule of return should not 
be applied automatically to every foreigner who enters or stays in Greece on an irregular basis. Cases 
should be screened in an individualised manner.  
Training programmes: The Greek authorities must invest in training programs of police officers, 
border guards, judicial authorities and administrative bodies dealing with irregular migrants and their 
claims. This would both expedite procedures and render the overall system more effective but also ensure 
that migrants are treated with respect and sensitivity to their status and vulnerabilities. 
 
Opportunities for legal entry are crucial in reducing irregular migration 
The case study on Albania shows that expanding the possibility of legal entry into Greece has had the 
immediate consequence of limiting irregular border crossings. On the other hand, the visa liberalisation 
regime for Albanian citizens visiting an EU country has enabled, even encouraged, Albanian migrants to 
circulate between the two countries working in seasonal jobs in agriculture, construction and tourism, 
mostly informally.  
While this is not an ideal situation for the authorities, it shows that labour market dynamics often regulate 
migration informally and often more effectively than restrictive policies. Naturally geographical proximity 
and strong ties between the two countries play an important part here in facilitating the circular 
movement. 
Similar dynamics have been confirmed in the case of Ukrainians and Georgians both in the 1990s and 
2000s. Faced with poverty and unemployment at home and in the absence of legal migration channels, 
they undertook the journey to Greece either with a real or with a fraudulent tourist visa and found 
employment through travel and employment agencies operating at the margins of legality, or through 
friends and relatives who were already in the country. 
 
Access to regularization schemes: Many migrants who have been legally residing in Greece on a long 
term basis have recently lost their permits in view of the crisis. In addition, second generation migrants 
must be provided with channels of regularization and integration.  
Facilitation of the access to labour market for low-skilled migrants: The data show that certain 
nationalities and their services are under increase demand in the Greek labour market. Economic 
migrants from Albanian, Ukraine and Georgia do get absorbed by the Greek labour market, in particular 
in the domestic sector. Greece should not only aim at attracting highly skilled migrants but also regularise 
the influx of low skill migrants and domestic workers. 
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The Greek labour market is better served through networks rather than 
through offer and demand planning 
The Albanian case study points to the dynamics of a buzzing informal labour market, which needs cheap 
and flexible seasonal work in tourism and agriculture. These pull factors and the pre-existing strong 
networks are critical in shaping the ‘irregular’ migration condition.  
The ‘metaklisi’ scheme (assessing the internal labour market needs and inviting foreigners to apply for a 
labour entry visa from their own country of origin along with the completion of complex paperwork by the 
employer)  does not correspond to the country’s labour market structure which is characterised by sectors 
with small entreprises (e.g. catering, tourism) and with seasonal labour needs (agriculture, fishing) or 
where the family is the employer of the migrant (domestic work, private care).  
Incentives for better application of seasonal workers schemes: The Greek state should provide 
incentives to employers to better enforce the law on seasonal work, put into place bureaucratically 
simplified procedures and inform workers about their rights. This would reduce instances of labour 
exploitation and increase tax incomes in the long-term. As IRMA shows, one of the main alternative 
strategies employed for irregular migrants so as to acquire a legal status, even if for a short period of time, 
was applying for asylum. 
Bilateral agreements for seasonal workers: The Greek authorities ought to invest further in 
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Project abstract 
The IRMA project investigates the dynamics of irregular migration (and asylum seeking) and the ways in 
which different actors and factors affect the nature and direction of the flows within an overall restrictive 
EU and national (Greek) migration policy regime. The project seeks to uncover the dynamics of the 
governance of irregular migration taking as its focus not the policies but rather the migrants, as central 
actors in the field. It has investigated what migrants do with the policies, how they make decisions and 
execute their plans, learn about policies and intermediaries, and factor them in, and eventually adopt one 
pathway or strategy of mobility instead of another. The project has thus concentrated on how migrants 
make sense of their own needs and wishes and how they conceptualise their (legal or irregular) mobility. 
The empirical research undertaken in this project concentrates empirically on three migration systems 
within which irregular migration is an important component of overall migration towards Greece: the 
Balkans to the EU migration system with a focus on Albanian irregular migration to Greece; the Eastern 
Europe to the EU migration system: with a focus on Georgian and Ukrainian migration to Greece; and the 
Southeast Asia to the EU migration system with a focus on Pakistani and Afghani migration to Greece.  
The project has developed along five parallel case studies on the five countries of origin of the migrants 
and Greece. The comparative analysis of the five case studies focuses on the dynamics of each of the three 
migration systems as well as the lessons we have learnt about the dynamics of irregular migration 
governance and the ways in which migrants interact with migration control policies. 
For more information visit the project’s website  http://irma.eliamep.gr 
 
 
